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1     Introduction 
 
Following the adoption of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (Civil Union Act) on 1 
December 2006, South Africa became one of very few countries to confer legal 
protection and marriage benefits on partners in same-sex relationships. The 
legislation was adopted as a direct response to the landmark decision of the 
Constitutional Court in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie.1 The Court had 
declared the lack of the legal recognition of same-sex relationships 
unconstitutional and had given Parliament a period of one year in which to 
develop a remedy that would allow same-sex partners to formalise their 
relationships. The Court had also cautioned Parliament to be sensitive and not 
to provide a remedy that would be calculated and perceived as producing new 
forms of marginalisation.2 
 
In this regard, Parliament opted to develop a separate institution of marriage, 
apart from the existing forms of marriage such as civil or customary marriages.3 
This new institution of marriage has generated extensive and complex 
questions in relation to the quality of legal protection accorded to partners in 
same–sex relationships. These questions touch on very broad issues such as 
institutional, social and religious beliefs, views and opinions, civil rights, ethics, 
                                            
*   17 of 2006. 
**   Nomthandazo Ntlama. B.Juris, LLB, LLM, Certificate in Comparative Human Rights. 
Senior Lecturer: Department of Public, Constitutional, and International Law, University 
of South Africa. 
1   2006 (1) SA 542 (CC) (hereafter Fourie). 
2   See Fourie par 139 and 150. 
3   It is worth noting that South Africa has not as yet recognised either Islamic or Hindu 
marriages. See also Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1997 12 BCLR 
1726 (CC). 
N NTLAMA  PER / PELJ  2010(13)1 
192 / 234 
values and principles.4 They undermine the development of a single strategy 
that will draw an appropriate balance between certain competing rights such as 
the rights to freedom of sexual orientation and freedom of religion. Such a 
balance may, however, be necessary to ensure that the substantive translation 
of the right to equality is an actuality for couples in same-sex relationships. 
 
The purpose of this contribution is to provide a succinct overview and analysis 
of the features of the Act. The objective is to determine the significance of the 
Act for the substantive translation of the right to freedom of sexual orientation 
vis-à-vis the right to freedom of religion within the framework of the right to 
equality. 
 
It is argued, firstly, that the Act has the potential to produce new forms of 
marginalisation, despite the caution by the Court. Secondly, the categorisation 
of marriages into heterosexual and homosexual marriages or civil unions has 
created legal uncertainty about the essence of the notion of equal rights for all, 
without distinction, as envisaged in the Constitution. Lastly, the allocation of 
people into various categories rather than allowing them to be just 'human 
beings' could defeat the purpose of establishing a 'just' society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.  
 
The intention is not to argue for a 'one-size-fits-all' approach, but to identify 
some of the factors which may be a barrier to the implementation of the Act and 
which could undermine the equal worth of persons in same-sex relationships. 
This contribution is therefore limited to an examination of the quality of the 
protection accorded to same-sex couples, and does not include an analysis of 
the nature of the institution of marriage itself or the theological and social 
dimensions of same-sex marriages.5 
 
                                            
4   See Robinson and Swanepoel 2004 PER 87-135. They had already identified the 
challenges relating to same-sex relationships even before the adoption of the Act. 
5   Sachs J in Fourie acknowledged the role played by religion in public life and strongly held 
that it would be out of order (the author's emphasis) to employ the religious sentiments of 
some as a guide to trample on the constitutional rights of others, par 92.  
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2 The general features of the Act  
 
The Constitutional Court has emphasised that the legislature is better placed to 
find the best ways of ensuring that people do not live in a state of 'legal 
blankness'.6 The Court's emphasis on the role of the legislature is deeply 
entrenched in the various sections of the Bill of Rights of the South African 
Constitution. The legislature has to adopt special legal measures (such as the 
design and adoption of statute law) in ensuring the facilitation of fundamental 
change as far as the elimination of inequalities and discrimination lingering from 
the past are concerned. The impact of the historic past on the promotion of 
human rights is clearly expressed by Mahomed DP in Azapo v President of the 
Republic of South Africa,7 where he stresses that: 
 
fundamental human rights became a major casualty of the conflict between 
the minority which reserved for itself all control over the political 
instruments of the state and the majority who sought to resist the 
domination and where their resistance was met by the laws that were 
designed to counter the effectiveness of such resistance.8 
 
The requirement for the development of legal measures in the quest for the 
elimination of inequalities and discrimination is also endorsed in the preamble 
of the Promotion of Equality and the Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act9 
which provides that: 
 
the prohibition of unfair discrimination and the promotion of the 
achievement of equality requires the development of special legal and 
other measures, of historically disadvantaged individuals, communities and 
social groups who were dispossessed of their land and resources, deprived 
of their human dignity and who continue to endure such consequences. 
 
The adoption of the measures referred to here the engagement of a proactive 
and activist legislature in order to achieve the objectives envisaged in the 
                                            
6  See Fourie par 72. 
7  1996 8 BCLR 1015 (CC). 
8  See Azapo par 1. 
9  4 of 2000 (the Equality Act). 
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Equality Act and the Constitution. The Constitutional Court in Carmichele v 
Minister of Safety and Security10 supports this view: 
 
there is a duty imposed on the state and all of its organs not to perform any 
act that infringes these rights. In some circumstances there would also be 
a positive component which obliges the state and its organs to provide 
appropriate protection to everyone through laws and structures designed to 
afford such protection.11 
 
The adoption of the Civil Union Act therefore took place within the context and 
against the background of affirming the legitimacy of the development of 
measures that are designed to protect persons or categories of persons 
previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.12 It takes into account South 
Africa's history, and the prejudicial context that people in same-sex 
relationships find themselves in - even in the new constitutional dispensation.13 
Effectively, it gives due recognition to the fact that the elimination of systematic 
discrimination against people in same-sex relationships cannot be achieved 
without positive action being taken by the state.14 
 
This Act was adopted in the context of a specific rights perspective, in order to 
protect the rights of people in same-sex relationships,15 who are often and are 
most vulnerable to discrimination and persecution. The normative impetus and 
the specific focus behind the adoption of the Act is to be found in section 9 of 
the Constitution.16 This provision provides a sound framework for the 
                                            
10   2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC). 
11   See Carmichele par 44. 
12   See also s 14(1) of the Equality Act. 
13   See the preamble of the Civil Union Act. 
14   See also Ngcobo J in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism 2004 7 BCLR 687 (CC) par 74. 
15   See the preamble of the Civil Union Act. 
16   S 9 provides that: “Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law. Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all 
rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other 
measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. The state may not unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including 
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture and birth. No person may 
unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in 
terms of subsection (3).”  It is also provided that discrimination on one or more of the 
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substantive translation and equal enjoyment of all fundamental rights in the Bill 
of Rights. It puts an emphasis on the centrality of the principles of equality and 
non-discrimination. These principles serve as the core foundation for the 
development of the national agenda for the promotion of equal rights for all 
people, including couples in same-sex relationships. 
 
In addition, the entrenchment of equality as a foundational value in the 
Constitution17 plays a significant role as far as the interpretation and limitation 
of fundamental rights is concerned. Jagwanth argues that it may be used by the 
courts even where the right is not directly invoked, allowing the substantive 
principle of equality to be the lens through which the application of the law 
should take place.18 The centrality of equality as a foundational value was 
endorsed by the Court in Minister of Finance v Van Heerden,19 where it held 
that:  
 
the achievement of equality is not only a guaranteed and justiciable right in 
our Bill of Rights but also a core and foundational value; a standard which 
must inform all law and against which all law must be tested for 
constitutional consonance.20 
 
The value-based approach to the right to equality in the context of the Civil 
Union Act is viewed as a progressive and transformative tool that seeks not 
only to remedy the injustices and ills of the past21 but also to ensure the 
development of affirmative measures in order to pave the way for the future 
achievement of equality for same-sex couples. The emphasis on the promotion 
of foundational values complements the purpose of the new constitutional and 
democratic order. The purpose of such an emphasis is to affirm the need for 
the establishment of a society in which all human beings, including same-sex 
                                                                                                                               
grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination 
is fair. 
17  See s 1, which provides that the Republic of South Africa is one sovereign, democratic 
state founded on the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality, the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism. 
18  Jagwanth "Expanding Equality" 131. 
19  2004 11 BCLT 1125 (CC). 
20  2004 11 BCLT 1125 (CC) par 22. 
21  Bonthuys 2008 Sexualities 726-739. 
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couples, are accorded equal dignity and respect, regardless of their 
membership of particular groups.22  
 
The intersection of the right to equality and the right to human dignity23 as 
envisaged in the preamble of the Act is of the utmost importance. The centrality 
of these rights, both in the Constitution and the Act bears witness to the lessons 
drawn from the past, that make these rights the cornerstone and foundational 
values in reconstructing the future of couples in same-sex relationships. The 
interdependence of these rights was similarly expressed by Sachs J in National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice24 as follows: 
 
the equality principle and the dignity principle should not be seen as 
competitive but rather as complementary. Inequality is established not 
simply through group-based differential treatment, but through 
differentiation which perpetuates disadvantage and leads to the scarring of 
the sense of dignity and self-worth associated with membership of the 
group. Conversely, an invasion of dignity is more easily established when 
there is an inequality of power and status between the violator and the 
victim.25 
 
In essence, the interdependence of these rights (the right to equality and the 
right to human dignity) provides a firm basis for a deeper understanding of the 
function of the law, including the Civil Union Act itself, in promoting the equal 
worth of all human beings. It enables the development of insight into the 
determination of the significance of the law in addressing both the underlying 
social and legal networks that limit the potential of the law to generate social 
change. It forms the basis upon which to establish a set of demands based on 
the intrinsic worth of the individual. It asserts that the right to marry without 
regard to the sex of the parties is a fundamental right of all persons and that 
limiting the applicability of such a right to heterosexuals only is irrational and 
invidiously discriminatory.26 The extension of the right  of equal opportunity to 
marriage for same-sex couples requires a positive action that directly benefits 
                                            
22   See President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 6 BCLR 708 (CC) par 41. 
23   See s 10 of the Constitution, which provides that 'everyone has inherent dignity and the 
right to have their dignity respected and protected'. 
24   1998 1 BCLR 1517 (CC). 
25   1998 1 BCLR 1517 (CC) par 125. 
26   See Wintemute Legal Recognition 1. 
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such couples. Such action is necessary to contribute to the fulfilment of the 
government's commitment to eliminate all forms of discrimination and prejudice 
as required by section 7(2)27 of the Bill of Rights.  
 
Overall, the Civil Union Act serves as a direct and accessible legal instrument 
in laying the foundation for the equal rights of people in same-sex relationships. 
It seeks to limit any potential for reliance on the courts for enforcing the right to 
equality because, as Mokgoro says, 'litigation tends to be the privilege of the 
economically empowered'.28 
 
3 The negative features of the Act 
After discussing the general features of the Civil Union Act, it would be 
reasonable to harbour a suspicion that the Act does not pass the litmus test of 
equitability.29 Although it appears to have asserted the right to equality by 
extending equal access to 'marriage' to same-sex couples, the Act seems 
flawed in some respects. The creation of a separate institution of 'marriage' has 
reduced the equal rights of couples in same-sex relationships to what Laycock 
et al refer to as a 'back-door' effort to undermine the general right to equality.30 
The basis of this contention is the 'legal separateness' affirmed in the Civil 
Union Act, which categorises people in South Africa into various groupings, 
confining them to particular 'closets'. The categorisation may hence relegate 
some people to the position of second-class citizens. It further gives the 
impression that certain members of our society are not worthy of the equal 
protection envisaged in the Constitution. The view was similarly expressed by 
Sachs J in Moseneke v The Master:31 
 
it is an affront to all of us that people are still treated as [heterosexuals and 
homosexuals] rather than as ordinary persons seeking to [enforce their 
                                            
27   This section provides that 'the state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights 
in the Bill of Rights'. 
28   Mokgoro 2003 Albany Law Review 1. 
29   A term extracted from the former President Mbeki, 'ANC Today', 8 Aug 2002, about his 
quest for the promotion of equality in South Africa. 
30    See the review by Gill of Laycock, Picarello and Wilson (eds) Same-sex Marriage. 
31   2001 2 BCLR 103 (CC). 
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rights] and it is in conflict with the establishment of a [just society] where 
rights and duties are no longer determined by [sexual orientation].32 
 
The legal separateness of the Act is informed by the fact that the Act firstly 
discriminatorily classifies the legal relationship of same-sex couples as 'unions', 
reducing them to nothing more than what the author would refer to as 'so-called 
marriages'. The classification of the relationships as 'unions' rather than actual 
'marriages' effectively worsens the continued intense suffering experienced by 
people in same-sex relationships. The right to a 'marriage' is not equal to the 
right to a 'union' as the Act itself seeks to deal with solemnisation of civil unions 
and the consequences of a 'civil union' which is not a 'marriage'.33 In this 
regard, the Civil Union Act has not, for example, defined what a marriage is34 It 
only entitles the parties to a 'union' by way of a 'marriage' or 'civil partnership'.35 
The lack of definition of the word 'marriage' in the Act creates uncertainty about 
the establishment of legal rules relating to the enforcement of equal rights 
within the context of couples in same-sex relationships vis-à-vis those in 
heterosexual relationships.  
 
Effectively, despite the invalidation of the common law definition of 'marriage' 
and section 30(1) of the Marriage Act36 in Fourie, the Civil Union Act does not 
affect the definition of the word 'marriage'. It still reserves the use of the term 
'marriage' exclusively to marriage 'between a man and a woman to the 
exclusion of others', as is envisaged in the Marriage Act. It is uncertain whether 
the concept of 'marriage' is a distinct concept that remains unquestioned in law, 
despite its invalidation by the Court. This leaves open the question of whether 
or not the decision to adopt the Act was an attempt to avoid public opposition to 
same-sex marriages, especially by religious institutions.37 
 
                                            
32   2001 2 BCLR 103 (CC) par 21. 
33   See the preamble of the Act. 
34   See s 1 of the Act. 
35   See s 2 (a) and (b). 
36  25 of 1961 (the Marriage Act).  See also O'Regan J's minority judgment concurring with 
the majority at par 164. 
37   See Reddy 'The same-sex marriage complex in South Africa: some conceptual, 
gendered and rights-based interpretations'. 
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It is noticeable that the Act denies same-sex couples the status of 'marriage' 
enjoyed by heterosexual couples. It could therefore violate the principles of 
non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Act develops a 
distinct set of constitutional principles in relation to the promotion of the right to 
equality for persons in same-sex relationships vis-à-vis people in heterosexual 
relationships. It does not provide for the requirements of a valid marriage and 
especially within the traditional value system in terms of customary law which 
requires negotiations and the payment of ilobola and other related requirements 
before the marriage can be solemnised. It also undermines section 2(3) of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act,38 which recognises the validity of 
polygamous marriages concluded in terms of the customary law system 
(despite the concerns the author may have about these marriages). It furthers 
the injury to homosexual couples and compromises the laying of the foundation 
for the construction of new paradigms, which need to be affirmed.39  
 
In addition, the legal categorisation of human relationships and human beings 
leaves a void in the determination of the context in and the extent to which the 
Civil Union Act may be examined in order to give effect to the affirmation of the 
equal rights of persons in same-sex relationships. The distinction strikes at the 
core of section 9(2) of the Bill of Rights as argued by Moseneke J in Van 
Heerden.40 Moseneke J argues for the development of an effective tool 
designed to assist and ensure the promotion of the substantive equal rights of 
all people, including same-sex couples, who have been disadvantaged through 
unfair discrimination. Such categorisation further undermines the potential of 
the Civil Union Act itself as an affirmative measure designed to improve the 
quality of life of persons in same-sex relationships.41  
 
In addition, section 3 of the Act endorses the legal separateness of same-sex 
couples in that it gives same-sex relationships an inferior status by providing 
that: 'this Act applies to civil partners joined in a civil union' only. 
                                            
38   120 of 1998 (hereafter Customary Act). 
39   See Fourie par 155. 
40   See Van Heerden (n 19) above par 38-41-44. 
41   See Ngcobo J in Bato Star (n 14) above par 74. 
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The section effectively establishes a 'gated community' of same-sex couples 
confined in a particular 'closet' different from that for heterosexual couples. It 
leaves (especially same-sex) couples without an option as to whether their 
relationship will fall under customary law or common law. It confines same-sex 
couples to engaging in 'so-called marriages,' which are defined as voluntary 
unions which are solemnised and registered by way of either a marriage or a 
civil partnership.42 
 
It affirms the perception of civil marriages as being superior to customary 
marriages, which were not incorporated into the national legal framework until 
the new constitutional dispensation in South Africa. Since the dawn of 
democracy, South Africa has made inroads into and transformed its marital 
regime by recognising customary marriages.43 The adoption of the Customary 
Act44 furthered the social and legal evolution of the marital regime in South 
Africa by giving equal recognition to customary and civil marriages, and also to 
partners in those marriages.45  
 
Although the issue of the perception of the superiority of civil marriages 
requires further research - it is not comprehensively addressed in this 
contribution - it may be pointed out that the perception is related to the 
provision of section 12 of the Customary Act. Section 12 requires the parties to 
a customary marriage to register it, even though the failure does not affect its 
validity. The validity of customary marriages in terms of customary law is 
determined by the negotiations between the bride and the groom's family, 
payment of ilobola and other procedural requirements.46 These procedural 
requirements were valid determinants of customary marriages. Section 12 
introduces the registration of customary marriages and such requirement 
undermines customary law as a legitimate system of law that is able to regulate 
                                            
42   See s 1 of the Act. 
43   See Andrews Washington and Lee Law Review 1483. 
44   See (n 37) above. 
45   See the preamble of the Customary Act. 
46   See Maithupfi and Bekker 2009 Obiter 164-174. 
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its own affairs and development. It reinforces and supplements the African 
value system with the Western conceptions of marriage, which are foreign to it, 
thus undermining the legitimacy of customary marriages.47 
 
The Civil Union Act ignored and actually missed an opportunity for addressing 
some of the complex questions that may be raised, especially within the system 
of customary law in, relation to the marriage of couples in same-sex 
relationships. These questions are related to procedural requirements such as 
the payment of ilobola. 
 
As the customary-law system is uncodified and evolves with changing 
circumstances, the fact that the Act does not recognise equal access to 
marriage either in terms of customary or common law puts couples in same-sex 
relationships at a disadvantage. It increases the vulnerability of couples in 
same-sex relationships, especially when they are beyond the borders of South 
Africa, and exposes them to persecution, as evidenced by the recent tabling of 
the Ugandan Bill prohibiting same-sex relationships.48 The Act may also 
undermine South Africa's obligations under international law as envisaged in 
the preamble of the Equality Act, which provides that:  
 
South Africa also has international obligations under binding treaties and 
customary international law in the field of human rights which promote 
equality and prohibit unfair discrimination. 
 
In essence, this section has closed off an opportunity for parallel development 
of the existing marital regimes within the context of partners in same-sex 
relationships. It implies that African traditional values and principles are too 
conservative in nature. Even if that were to be true,49 the affirmation of the 
equal status of marital regimes through either common or customary law may 
                                            
47   See also Ngcobo J in Bhe v Khayelitsha Magistrate 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) par 212, 230 
and 235, where he argues that customary law should be allowed to develop within its 
own value system. 
48   See the report by Olukya Associated Press 8 January 2010. 
49   See the report by BBC News 'Homosexuality in Africa' 28 June 2002, in which it was 
reported that President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe described couples in same-sex 
relationships as being worse than 'dogs or pigs', who, because of their 'unnatural 
perversion', are not entitled to basic human rights. 
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have provided an opportunity for tolerance and accommodation of couples in 
same-sex relationships within the framework especially of the African value 
system. 
 
Section 6 of the Act, which is intertwined with section 5, further provides that: 
 
a marriage officer, other than the one designated in terms of section 5, may 
in writing inform the Minister that he or she objects on the grounds of 
conscience, religion and belief to solemnise a civil union between persons 
of the same sex, whereupon that marriage officer shall not be compelled to 
solemnise such civil union. 
 
The equal contest between the right to freedom of sexual orientation and the 
right to freedom of religion has made the development of the principles of non-
discrimination subject to the social, moral and legal convictions of those 
authorised to solemnise marriages. It allows the enforcement of equal rights to 
depend on the willingness of marriage officers to use their discretion in 
balancing their constitutional rights to religion and the right of same-sex couples 
to equal benefit of the law. It is equally striking that officers employed to 
conduct public service in line with the values and principles of public 
administration50 will have to make potentially difficult decisions whether to 
marry same-sex couples or not. It has actually created a constitutional cross-
roads51which same-sex couples will not be able to cross in order to solemnise 
their relationships as marriages. It reinforces the formal conception of the law 
without actually moving beyond its own limitations. It also minimises the 
specific-rights perspective which motivated the adoption of the Civil Union Act. 
 
Whether same-sex couples have access to marriage or not depends on the 
convictions of marriage officers who often do not wish to recognise the 
difference between same-sex and heterosexual couples, wishing instead to 
eliminate the consequences of such differentiation. But the issue is whether or 
not heterosexual and same-sex couples are receiving identical treatment rather 
                                            
50   See s 195 of the Constitution and the Public Service Act 103 of 1994, which seek to 
regulate and improve governance in public administration in support of vision and 
efficiency and increased public participation in governance.  
51   See Strasser On Same-sex Marriages 24. 
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than  whether or not the Civil Union Act, through its effective application and 
proper interpretation, will be able to eliminate the unequal consequences of 
such differentiation. For example, by having adopted the Civil Union Act, the 
government has acknowledged that same-sex couples are identically situated 
to heterosexual couples in relation to the marital laws of South Africa.  
 
As argued elsewhere, the 'differentiation approach' not only prohibits differential 
treatment, but also allows for differentiation in appropriate cases to enhance the 
respect and the promotion of fundamental freedoms for everyone.52 The 
identical treatment of similarly situated individuals (same-sex and heterosexual 
couples) without an adequate justification of the legitimate purpose of the 
government runs contrary to the principles of non-discrimination.53  
 
In this regard, the failure of the Act to recognise the difference between and 
identity of same-sex and heterosexual couples undermines the argument by 
Sachs J in Fourie, where he argues that: 
 
a democratic, universalistic, caring and aspirationally egalitarian society 
embraces everyone and accepts people for who they are. To penalise 
people for being who and what they are is profoundly disrespectful of the 
human personality and violatory of equality. Equality means equal concern 
and respect across difference. It does not presuppose the elimination or 
suppression of difference. Respect for human rights requires the 
affirmation of self, not the denial of self. Equality therefore does not imply a 
levelling or homogenisation of behaviour or extolling one form as supreme, 
and another as inferior, but an acknowledgement and acceptance of 
difference. At the very least, it affirms that difference should not be the 
basis for exclusion, marginalisation and stigma. At best, it celebrates the 
vitality that difference brings to any society.54 
 
The identical treatment of different types of couples within the framework of the 
right to freedom of religion fails to acknowledge the significance of the law in 
dealing with both the legal and socially constructed roles that seek to 
compromise the equal worth of the rights of same-sex couples. Such treatment 
undermines the already developed jurisprudence that has emanated from the 
                                            
52  See a further analysis in Ntlama 2009 Malawi Law Journal 117-132. 
53  See Klein and Redman Connecticut Law Review 1383-1396 and 1394. 
54   See Fourie par 60. 
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Constitutional Court on equality, that focusing on the impact of the 
differentiation on vulnerable groups, including same-sex couples.55 The 
jurisprudence has put an emphasis on the substantive realisation of the right to 
equality. The purpose of such an emphasis is to establish a future that is 
founded on the ideals of reconciliation in and reconstruction of our society.56 
The right to equal benefit of the law cannot be a 'throat-clearing' exercise, as 
argued by Sachs J in Mhlungu,57 if it has to equally address the intense 
suffering of the past and the injustice which continues to manifest itself in this 
new constitutional dispensation.  
 
The contest between the right to freedom of religion and the right to freedom of 
sexual orientation in the Civil Union Act has made the substantive translation of 
the right to equality subject to a 'mere choice'. The choice enables the marriage 
officers to use their discretion, forcing them to draw a distinction between 
people, which perpetuates the privileges of couples in heterosexual 
relationships, as argued by Langa CJ in MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v 
Pillay58 that: 
 
[the discretion] enforces mainstream and historically privileged forms ... at 
the expense of minority and historically excluded [groups]. It thus places a 
burden on [partners in same-sex relationships] who are unable to express 
themselves fully ... in an environment that does not completely accept 
them.59 
 
The foundation for the relegation of substantive principles such as the right to 
equality to such a discretion or a “mere choice” was laid down by the Court in 
Fourie, where it was held that: 
 
religious institutions would remain undisturbed in their ability to perform 
marriage ceremonies according to their own tenets, and thus if they 
wished, to celebrate heterosexual marriages only.60 
 
                                            
55   See Harksen v Lane 1997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC) par 51. 
56   See S v Mhlungu 1995 7 BCLR 793 (CC) par 111. 
57   S v Mhlungu 1995 7 BCLR 793 (CC) par 112. 
58   2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) (hereafter Pillay). 
59   2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) par 44. 
60   See Fourie par 159. 
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The choice forces marriage officers to make difficult decisions by weighing 
different considerations on what would constitute an allegiance to religious 
beliefs against the their faith in the equal worth of all people. This contention 
was affirmed by Sachs J in Christian Education of South Africa v Minister of 
Education,61 who argues that: 
 
the underlying problem in any open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom in which conscientious and religious 
freedom has to be regarded with appropriate seriousness, is how far such 
democracy can and must go in allowing members of religious communities 
to define for themselves which laws they will obey and which not.
 
Such a 
society can cohere only if all its participants accept that certain basic norms 
and standards are binding. Accordingly, believers cannot claim an 
automatic right to be exempted by their beliefs from the laws of the land. At 
the same time, the state should, wherever reasonably possible, seek to 
avoid putting believers to extremely painful and intensely burdensome 
choices of either being true to their faith or else respectful of the law.62 
(own emphasis).  
 
Marriage officers subscribing to certain religious beliefs may marginalise same-
sex couples seeking marriage because they do not or cannot conform to 
'perceived certain acceptable' social norms.63 It further leaves uncertainty 
regarding the genuineness of subscription to religious beliefs and an 
unwillingness to solemnise same-sex marriages. Although the above falls 
outside the scope of this contribution, it may require resource-intensive further 
research. 
 
In essence, the Civil Union Act does not put same-sex couples on an equal 
footing with heterosexual couples as far as all of the other rights and 
responsibilities enjoyed by the latter group are concerned. The right of access 
to marriage has become a prerogative of heterosexual couples. The Civil Union 
Act relegated this right to a secondary position for same-sex couples, thus 
systematically institutionalising their stigmatisation. The fact that the 'status' of 
marriage in the Civil Union Act is not available to same-sex couples is a cause 
for concern. It defeats any transformative value that the acceptance of same-
                                            
61   2000 10 BCLR 1051 (CC). 
62   2000 10 BCLR 1051 (CC) par 35. 
63   See Pillay par 73. 
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sex marriages may have as far as the concept 'marriage' is concerned, 
because the Act does not deconstruct the old standing principle that marriage is 
between a 'man and a woman to the exclusion of others'.64 
 
The denial of the equal status of marriage for same-sex couples compromises 
the potential of using the law as a strategy for social change. As Kakabadse 
puts it: 
 
law is an ideology of justice that encompasses equal accessibility which 
must lead to the results that are individually and socially just.65 
 
In this regard, the legal separateness of equal rights for same-sex vis-à-vis 
heterosexual couples has created a 'social, legal and constitutional dilemma' 
regarding the central role of the law and its impact on the manner in which 
members of society should relate to one another. The interdependence of law 
and social justice provides an opportunity for examining the existence of 
underlying social ills that could be harmful to our society.  
 
Of great concern is the fact that the interaction between the law and society 
forms the basis for understanding not only the law itself, but also broader 
issues relating to equality and social justice. Sachs J in Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers66 framed the intersection of the law and social 
justice within the prescripts of the African value system, which embraces 
concepts such as 'ubuntu'”. He argued as follows: 
 
thus, [the law] expressly requires the court to infuse elements of grace and 
compassion into the formal structures of the law. It is called upon to 
balance competing interests in a principled way and promote the 
constitutional vision of a caring society based on good neighbourliness and 
shared concern. The Constitution confirms that we are not islands unto 
                                            
64   See the report by SAPA The Sowetan 28 January 2010, where it is reported that a 
complaint of hate speech has been laid with the South African Human Rights 
Commission in Mpumalanga against the Pan Africanist Youth Congress. It is alleged 
that the Youth Congress had gone to the extent of undermining not only the dignity of 
same-sex couples but the Constitution itself, as quoted in the newspaper: 'We are 
saying to hell with the SA Constitution for giving rights to gays and lesbians. 
Homosexuality is totally immoral and there is no place for gays and lesbians'. 
65   Kakabadse 2001 Women in Management Review 241. 
66   2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC). 
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ourselves. The spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the 
majority of the population, suffuses the whole constitutional order. It 
combines individual rights with a communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying 
motif of the Bill of Rights, which is nothing if not a structured, 
institutionalised and operational declaration in our evolving new society of 
the need for human interdependence, respect and concern.67 (own 
emphasis) 
 
Therefore, the disparity of equal access to marriage endorses an argument by 
Faundez that legal reform is a 'fatal attraction', as he contends that: 
 
the adoption of these laws is not always the best of the alternatives 
available to permeate every facet of the laws because social problems are 
not always resolved by enacting new rules. It is often the case that new 
legal rules are not the best solution either because there is no agreement 
in society as to the content of the rules or because the rules simply do not 
reach the group that they are meant to reach.68 
 
Although the Civil Union Act is important for a number of reasons, the 
institutionalised limitation of the right to equal access to marriage gives 
credence to Faundez's argument. The Act does not give sufficient recognition 
to the status of same-sex couples. Despite the positive features of the Act, its 
adoption has created a separate status that strengthens the view that same-sex 
couples do not deserve the same status and respect as heterosexual couples. 
The positive features of the Act are outweighed by the disadvantages it brings 
for the recognition of the equal status of all marriages in South Africa. Overall, 
the factors discussed above, give effect to what Davis refers to as the 'emperor 
that is still naked',69 as they pose difficulties in relation to the implementation of 
the Civil Union Act. 
 
4 Conclusion 
Having provided more questions than answers, the Fourie judgment just 
captured the scenario by laying the foundation for the adoption of the Civil 
Union Act. This Act serves as the litmus test for the promotion and achievement 
                                            
67   2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC) par 37. See also Mokgoro J in S v Makwanyane 1995 6 
BCLR 335 (CC) par 300. 
68   Faundez SELA 6. 
69   Davis 2009 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 949-992.  
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of equality in South Africa. The promotion of human-rights standards and 
obligations associated with the right to equality remains at the core in 
consolidating our hard-fought democracy. South Africa's Constitution requires 
social, legal and constitutional equality, but the fact that civil marriages or 
unions remain a separate institution for same-sex couples represents a real 
and powerful inequality.70 Having the right to equality on paper means very little 
if it will not effectively impact on, and change the lives of couples in same-sex 
relationships. There is a danger that South Africa used the rhetoric of equality 
just to keep up appearances. 
 
                                            
70   See Gertsmann Same-sex Marriages 116. 
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